Contemporary Corporate Theory Applied to the Health Care Sector: A Canadian Perspective by Sarra, Janis
Seattle Journal for Social Justice 
Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 38 
November 2004 
Contemporary Corporate Theory Applied to the Health Care 
Sector: A Canadian Perspective 
Janis Sarra 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj 
Recommended Citation 
Sarra, Janis (2004) "Contemporary Corporate Theory Applied to the Health Care Sector: A Canadian 
Perspective," Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 38. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol3/iss1/38 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice 
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
 345 
Contemporary Corporate Theory Applied to the 
Health Care Sector:  
A Canadian Perspective 
Janis Sarra1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article briefly considers the intersection between corporate 
governance and the delivery of health care services.  It suggests that while 
effective governance is critical to the oversight and delivery of health care, 
the very nature of health care service is that it provides essential services to 
citizens.  Hence, efficiency, which is classically one attribute of effective 
governance, must be defined differently if the oversight of health care 
delivery is to meet its public policy goals of timely and accessible health 
care.  Although the focus of this article is Canada’s health care system, 
which is largely not-for-profit, there are comparative lessons that can be 
drawn for governance in the health care market in the United States.   
Generally, corporate governance is the structure and processes by which 
corporate decisions are made so that capital is raised in a cost-effective 
manner, assets are utilized to efficiently generate wealth, and corporate 
directors and officers are accountable to those investing in the firm in a 
manner that controls agency costs.2  In the health care context, the 
governance of health care institutions such as hospitals, nursing homes, 
medical laboratories, diagnostic centers and clinics, includes government 
funding, insurance plans, investment strategies, and raising capital in a cost-
effective manner through fees for services.  In addition, assets must also be 
used effectively.  Efficiency considerations include not only the cost-benefit 
analysis of a particular decision, but also contain an important element of 
service delivery.  Effective governance means the timely delivery of the 
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health care products or services, while having regard for resource limits, as 
well as accessibility and universality goals.  When services are delivered 
privately, there are different kinds of pressures.  Private sector health 
providers in Canada and the United States face both service pressures and 
profit-maximizing pressures in their governance decisions.  
Effective governance oversight requires development and 
implementation of strategic planning, oversight of the decision making and 
risk assessment processes, and supervision of corporate officers to prevent 
shirking or self-dealing transactions.  Contemporary corporate governance 
theory suggests that there are a number of principles for good corporate 
governance.  These principles include the effective stewardship of the 
enterprise, the independence of corporate directors, effective audit reviews, 
and the enhanced disclosure of corporate transactions to shareholders and 
other stakeholders.  In the health care context, effective governance 
encompasses the consideration of both public and private interests in the 
effective management and delivery of health care services, with the public 
interest continuing to be the principal consideration. 
In Canada, there is a lack of scholarship regarding governance in the 
health care marketplace.  As a result, this article is meant to provide an 
introduction to the topic of governance and a means to generate discussion.  
It raises issues and questions, as opposed to providing a comprehensive 
analysis.  Part II sets the framework for the discussion by examining the 
structure of health care delivery in Canada and its socio-economic context.  
Part III provides a brief introduction to the growing debate in Canada as to 
whether health care services should be delivered exclusively by public 
service deliverers, or whether there is a role for private for-profit 
corporations.  Funding limits may drive decision makers towards greater 
privatization; however, there are numerous concerns, including how 
international trade policies may affect long-term health care delivery and 
policy choices.   
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Part IV examines the intersection of corporate and health care 
governance, and suggests several policy objectives that should be 
considered in analyzing effective governance in the health care sector.  Part 
V explores the governance challenges particular to the health care sector, 
including system sustainability, oversight, and infectious disease crisis 
management.  This article suggests that instruments that may be used in the 
health care marketplace to ensure effective governance include competent 
stewardship and accountability to a broader constituency, enhanced 
disclosure, implementation and monitoring of privacy policies, and 
decision-making processes that deal with the specific challenge of ethical 
decisions in a market context. 
II.  THE CANADIAN HEALTH SERVICES CONTEXT 
Canada’s delivery of medical and health care services differs 
substantially in its capital structure from the delivery given in the United 
States.  In contrast to the largely privately capitalized U.S. system, Canada’s 
health care delivery is still, for the most part, publicly funded.3  The 
governing legislation, the Canada Health Act (CHA), has long had the 
objective of providing universal access to health care.4  Health care services 
are primarily paid through tax dollars.5  Thus, while health care is not “free” 
because Canadians support the system financially, all individuals receive 
necessary medical and health care services without having to pay fees for 
service at the time of delivery.  Given that most of Canada’s health care is 
provided on a not-for-profit basis, the issues of governance, accountability, 
and ethics in health care oversight differ in Canada from the private for-
profit sector considerations faced by the U.S. health care market. 
A few points regarding the structure of Canadian health care illustrate the 
differences between the Canadian and United States regimes that have 
implications for governance in the health care sector.  Canadian health care 
is a national system that is delivered locally and is based on inter-
governmental policy and funding.  Constitutionally, both federal and 
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provincial governments have jurisdiction over aspects of health care 
delivery in Canada even though the primary responsibility rests with the 
provinces.6  The CHA sets out the framework for health care in Canada as 
well as the funding structure.  It enshrines basic principles of Canadian 
Medicare, specifically, public administration, universality, accessibility, 
portability, and comprehensiveness.  In 2002, CHA services amounted to 
$44 billion or 42.4 percent of the total public and private health care 
expenditures.7  71 percent of the total funding for Canadian health care 
comes from taxation.8  Provincial per capita health care spending rose 16 
percent in the past decade.9  Regional health authorities, which are funded 
by general tax revenues, allocate resources to coordinate and try to improve 
services aimed at promoting and protecting health.  They also work towards 
the prevention of disease and injury.10  The vast majority of Canadian 
hospitals are nonprofit institutions and, in most provinces, are operated by 
regional health authorities.  
Additionally, the CHA effectively bans patient-user fees on hospital and 
physician services.11  Physicians are primarily sole or group practitioners 
with service arrangements at hospitals, who are paid on a fee for service 
basis by provincial government health insurance plans.  Hence, individuals 
that access physician services at hospitals or at physician offices, rarely, if 
ever, pay fees for those services.  There are also community health clinics in 
which doctors are salaried, which are similar to some HMOs in the United 
States, except that they are funded by public tax dollars instead of group 
insurance or other private contributions.12  Canada has also developed a 
strong paramedic and public health workforce, with a range of professionals 
engaged in preventive and palliative care.  More than one million and a half 
Canadians work in health care and social services supporting health care.13 
For many years, the private sector played virtually no role in health care 
delivery in Canada; however, this has changed in the past two and a half 
decades.  Private sector health services that exist now are directly paid for 
by individuals or are covered through private insurance or employee benefit 
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plans.  The private sector now delivers $33 billion in services, which 
comprises 32.4 percent of Canada’s total health care expenditures.14  Large, 
for-profit businesses are confined primarily to laboratory and diagnostic 
services and long-term health care facilities.15  Home care services cost $2.7 
billion annually; nursing homes and other chronic care facilities cost $6.8 
billion annually; and $800 million is spent on non-physician professional 
health services each year.16  Under the CHA and companion provincial 
legislation, private companies are prohibited from selling insurance 
contracts for medically necessary physician and hospital services; however, 
they can sell health insurance for uninsured health services beyond the 
scope of provincial health insurance plans.17  Individuals receive tax 
deductions if their uninsured medical expenses are greater than 3 percent of 
their income, consisting of deductions worth an estimated $4 billion per 
year.18   
A national Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, the 
Romanow Report, recently analyzed the challenges and opportunities for 
health care delivery and access in Canada.19  The Romanow Report 
discussed how Canada could ensure the long-term sustainability of a 
universally accessible, publicly-funded health care system.20  Although the 
report focuses on the consumer side of the issues, some of its findings set 
the context for discussing governance and health care.  The Romanow 
Report found that Canadians continue to desire a truly national health care 
system; want a more comprehensive and accountable health care system; 
and generally believe that equal and timely access to medically necessary 
health care services is a right of citizenship.21   The  Report’s extensive 
study revealed that Canadian Medicare has consistently delivered 
affordable, timely, accessible, and quality health care and that, with a few 
exceptions, Canada’s health outcomes are among the best in the world.22  
Yet, the Report found that there are monumental changes occurring in 
Canada’s health care delivery system.  These include changes to traditional 
medical models, the growth of multidisciplinary approaches to health 
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prevention and treatment, the growth in drug therapy, and the increasing 
capital costs for diagnostic and treatment equipment.  The rapid changes 
have created new risks for governance oversight of the sector, including a 
new awareness by Canadians of the risks to universality that are inherent in 
rapidly rising costs and pressures to privatize services.   
III.  THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DEBATE 
A key debate in Canada is the extent to which the current public system 
should allow for private delivery of services.  The delivery of primary 
health care in Canada is still largely a not-for-profit enterprise, even though 
for-profit corporations have long been active in the nursing home and home 
for the aged sectors, in diagnostic and laboratory services, and, increasingly, 
in providing support services to hospitals.  While a comprehensive analysis 
is beyond the scope of this brief paper, it is important to note that the 
pressure to consider divesting particular health services has become a 
critical debate in the future of health care delivery.  
The implications of the public/private debate for governance are evident.  
Current boards of directors or health councils charged with overseeing 
nonprofit service delivery are responsible for ensuring that health care 
managers utilize resources with a view toward efficient and effective 
service delivery.  Additionally, while fiscal accountability is important, the 
pressure of making a profit does not currently drive oversight, dictate actual 
governance decisions, or set measures of performance.  Further shifts to 
private sector delivery of the public system would generate a host of new 
pressures on these directors and officers that would likely detract from the 
universal goals of Canada’s Medicare system. 
Given Canada’s longstanding commitment to publicly delivered health 
services, the introduction of private service providers in any aspect of health 
care delivery was controversial, particularly in the late 1970s and early 
1980s when U.S. corporations sought to enter the Canadian market.  
Scholars, health care providers, and hospital directors were concerned that 
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the price of economies of scale and efficiency would sacrifice the quality of 
care for those who must access the health care system.  This private/public 
debate recently reappeared as hospital boards and other oversight bodies 
grappled with burgeoning health care costs.  Given the resources available, 
particularly in the long-term and chronic care areas of delivery, in which the 
private sector has already made inroads in the market, there is continuing 
debate regarding whether private sector service delivery is of the highest 
possible quality.  One example is the decision of directors and officers to 
distribute resources away from long-time loyal caregivers in long-term care 
facilities to less expensive labor that has been contracted without the same 
continuity of care.  This has squarely raised the question of how profit 
considerations can drive service delivery decisions.  There is also concern 
that the corporations already delivering chronic and long-term care in 
Canada will shift into primary health care and, consequently, will risk 
eroding some of the best features of Medicare.  
A particularly controversial issue is the move by some provinces to 
public-private partnerships, referred to as “P3s.”  P3s are a relatively recent 
phenomenon, arising in part from limited capital funds to build medical and 
health care facilities.  There are different types of P3s, including the 
privatization of public assets, the contracting out of services, and the 
financing, building, and operating of new facilities under long-term leases.  
Several Canadian studies that have advocated for a greater move toward 
public private partnerships suggest that this practice has long been 
established in the United States.  These partnerships are being considered 
for hospital construction, service delivery, records management, and 
diagnostic services.23  However, the Romanow Report observed that these 
partnerships often cost more in the long term and contested the quality of 
their service delivery on a for-profit basis.24  Despite this report, several 
provinces are proceeding with construction of hospitals on a P3 basis with 
only limited public policy input into the decision.  Essentially, the 
governance issue arising from these developments is whether P3s are an 
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effective model of delivery of public services when governance is divested 
to private for-profit decision makers.   
The current privatization initiatives are also driven by strong normative 
perceptions that when resources are limited, for-profit managers are more 
effective at raising capital and delivering services.  Equally, there is a 
perception that public decision makers are not as accountable in their 
management activities because they do not have to be concerned with the 
“bottom line” in the same way as private for-profit firms.  However, these 
perceptions are not supported by empirical evidence.  There are numerous 
instances of financial distress, mismanagement, and bankruptcy of for-profit 
health care providers, just as there are instances of financial and operational 
success.  Moreover, the publicly governed health sector frequently has 
strong governance.   
Not-for-profit hospitals and other boards are often comprised of business 
and community leaders who contribute not only effective oversight and 
financial skills, but have put in place comprehensive governance structures 
for strategic planning, risk management, and service delivery.  Hence, for-
profit corporations are not necessarily more efficient; efficiency depends on 
the governance structure in place, including accountability to investors and 
oversight of managers’ operational decisions.  The measure of effective 
governance is obscured when discussed as only involving private/public 
capacity to be efficient.  Effective governance structures and practices, in 
either sector, underlie the quality of delivery of health care services.  
Therefore, broad generalizations about the ability to manage mask a much 
deeper normative debate regarding the role of the government in the 
delivery of services.  All other factors equal, public delivery is preferable 
because any excess dollars generated are efficiencies reinvested in the 
health care delivery system, as opposed to being siphoned off, in the form 
of dividends or interest payments, to meet the demands by private investors 
for return on their capital. 
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Endorsing public delivery of health care as an effective governance 
model for Canada does not suggest, however, that not-for-profit delivery is 
unencumbered by the pressures that the private sector faces.  For example, 
in some provinces, hospital funding is based on cost management.  Funding 
is adjusted for relative efficiency performance and measured on the basis of 
cost per weighted case over all inpatient and day surgery activities, 
compared against the expected cost per weighted case.25  Hospitals that are 
more efficient on this basis receive more funding, creating a risk of 
competition for increased patient volumes to the detriment of quality and 
effective governance.  While there is no doubt that competition is a 
prerequisite for continued economic growth, such strategies may cast the 
paradigm of the desired outcome too narrowly in terms of the continued 
development of effective health care delivery.  
Public funding of health care is not without its governance challenges, 
particularly in the structure of transfers of federal and provincial funds to 
local and regional service delivery organizations.  The recent shift to global 
funding from the old line-by-line health and medical care services approval 
streamlined the administrative costs associated with determining transfer 
fund amounts, reducing transaction costs in the determination of health care 
funding allocation.  While this shift has reduced oversight costs in the 
central funding of health care, it raises the issue of fairness and a lack of 
transparency in the allocation of resources and determination of which 
decisions maximize health outcomes.  This change has moved the locus of 
accountability for distributive decision-making from the relatively public 
arena of governmental budget approval to the relatively less public 
deliberations of hospital boards and management committees.  Hence, the 
governance challenge is how the boards and committees can be held 
accountable for their distributive decisions.   
As noted earlier, effective governance includes mechanisms for 
transparency and accountability to those with an interest or investment in 
the organization.  In response to these changes, there must be a mechanism 
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in place to ensure that hospital directors and other health care managers are 
engaging in decision making aimed at meeting the public policy goals of 
Canada’s Medicare system. 
Canada has a mixed market economy with a very developed corporate 
sector and healthy capital market.  Hence the notion that health care is better 
delivered by the public system differs from the perception that other 
economic activity is best generated by private sector activity.  This 
normative choice of delivery model is a result of the longstanding principles 
of the CHA.  Yet, there are pressures for change.  The business lobby to 
alter the system has become very active, particularly from U.S. based 
companies entering the Canadian market.  The Romanow Commission 
faced calls from business interests for a greater shift towards providing 
private health care services that included user fees, medical savings 
accounts, de-listing of Medicare-covered services, greater privatization, and 
a parallel private health care delivery system.26  The Commission sought 
evidence on how these proposals would improve the delivery of health care 
services and concluded that the evidence was not forthcoming.27   
Instead, it found overwhelming evidence that user fees, even at relatively 
low levels, impede access to necessary health care for the poor.28  Although 
the Report expressed concern about the recent growth in private services, 
private capital is increasingly part of the Canadian public health care 
system.  For example, private magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) clinics 
allow those with resources to have preference in the public system for 
treatment over those waiting for publicly-financed MRI services as a 
condition precedent to treatment decisions.29  The Report advocated that the 
government draw a clear line between direct health care services such as 
hospital and medical care that should continue to be governed as public 
services, and other services such as food preparation and maintenance, 
which increasingly are delivered through private enterprises.30  Thus, at the 
heart of the debate about the public/private divide is a strong normative 
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commitment by Canadians to retain the universality and accessibility of 
health care service delivery. 
A.  The Challenge of Trade Treaties 
Another key aspect of the health care governance debate is the impact of 
trade treaties on the integrity of the Canadian system.  As a function of 
Canada’s limited bargaining power, Canada has not faired well in 
international trade agreements with the United States.  Now, the concern is 
that treaties will be used to dismantle current protections that maintain the 
integrity of the health care system.  A recent study by the Canadian Centre 
for Policy Alternatives examined how P3 financing could negatively impact 
Canada based on its trade and investment treaty obligations.31  The study 
found a risk to the Canadian Medicare system due to trade and investment 
liberalization.  The Centre observed that if P3s become entrenched in 
Canada, foreign health care insurers and companies could make use of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) expropriation-
compensation rules to remove current protection for Canada’s Medicare 
system.32  
Under NAFTA, Canada originally negotiated exemptions for the health 
sector that allowed the Canadian government to maintain all non-
conforming provincial government measures, including most health care 
delivery.  Any shift away from nonprofit to for-profit health care may be 
irreversible because existing services under Canadian Medicare are 
protected, but not necessarily new initiatives, including a shift to for-profit 
services.33  The study also found that ongoing negotiations to expand the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) are placing considerable 
pressure on the Canadian government for new restrictions on domestic 
regulation that protect Canada’s Medicare system.34  Under GATS, any 
reductions in public health insurance coverage that governments could opt 
for today would be difficult for governments to reverse in the future.35  
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Given the importance of the Canadian Medicare system, steps should be 
taken to protect the system against potential challenges under international 
trade treaties.36  This is a governance issue because local governments and 
health care providers may undertake decision making based on short-term 
financial pressures without appreciating that they may be exposing both 
their own organization and the health system more generally to treaty 
litigation.  In turn, this could lead to higher costs for comparable or lower 
service delivery, creating a downward spiral of funding and services that 
those with oversight would have difficulty stemming.   
Trade treaty risks need to be factored into governance decisions, yet there 
is currently a lack of transparency and accountability in terms of how, if at 
all, this is done.  The current policy setting in health care is structured such 
that the governance decisions being made at the local level do not properly 
take into account the broader public policy implications.  Governance 
decisions such as the universality of insurance for particular services, P3 
projects, and financing of services, must be strategically planned to 
maximize the use of existing protections under NAFTA and GATS.37  In 
order to accomplish this, local and regional health care decision makers 
need to consider the broader public policy implications of local delivery 
decisions and, in turn, undertake their planning processes to assure that 
Canadian citizens have input, and to require the local decision makers to 
have some degree of accountability.  In this way, Canada may be able to 
preserve and extend universal access to services and prevent erosion of the 
quality of health care delivery.  
B.  Rhetoric and Reality 
The above mentioned issues illustrate the corporate governance 
challenges in the health care marketplace.  Canadian health care providers 
are struggling with the growing costs of health care delivery and the 
challenges of sustainability.  Given that provinces control most of the 
primary health care delivery, there are also growing tensions between 
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provinces that have adopted a slash and burn type of system and those that 
struggle to maintain the universality of the system.  For the casual observer, 
the true extent of the challenge is masked.  For example, in the past two 
years in British Columbia, media accounts are replete with protesting health 
care workers and consumers regarding wholesale reduction of health care 
funding and services.  Yet the 2003–04 Service Plan of the Ministry of 
Health discusses reforms that are patient-centered, accessible, and high 
quality, which result in improved health and wellness and are sustainable 
and affordable over the long term.38  On paper, the goals appear to align 
with good health care governance, but the recent cutbacks suggest that more 
transparency regarding the changes and empirical studies are necessary 
before one can assess the direction of health care in that province.  This is 
echoed across Canada and was part of the genesis of the Romanow Report 
on the future of national health care.39 
In 2004, the public/private divide in health care delivery will be tested 
before the Supreme Court of Canada in Chaoulli v. Attorney General of 
Québec.40  The Court will consider the constitutionality of provisions in 
health insurance legislation that prohibit private health care insurance for 
services covered under Québec’s health insurance plan.  Similar 
prohibitions are reflected in provincial legislation across Canada.41  
Canadians can travel outside of the province or the country and can pay for 
medical services or seek services on a fee-for-service basis at private 
clinics.  The issues are whether Canadians should be able to purchase 
insurance to cover such costs, whether such insurance would create a two-
tiered health care system, and what the appropriate balance of public and 
private access to health care should be. 
The Canadian health care context, and particularly the public/private 
divide issues, provides the backdrop for thinking about health care 
governance.  While P3s and other recent pressures to move to for-profit 
enterprises have not fully taken hold in Canada, they serve as sources of 
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normative and financial pressure on decision makers as they make 
governance decisions in the delivery of public services.  
IV.  THE INTERSECTION OF CORPORATE AND HEALTH CARE 
GOVERNANCE 
A benchmark of effective corporate governance is the quality of the 
corporate board’s oversight of the activities of the corporation and its 
officers and agents.  Governance generally raises questions about whether 
investors are adequately protected, the effectiveness of strategic planning 
processes, how efficiency is measured, and who participates in the 
risk/benefit decisions that form the basis of corporate transactions.  
However, in the health care marketplace, governance entails developing 
strategic planning for the health care institution or enterprise, the oversight 
of the activities of health care managers or officers, the consideration of 
whether multiple users or stakeholders are adequately protected in their 
receipt of medical or health services or in their investments, and the 
participation in risk assessment processes including consideration of the 
ethical issues that arise in the context of the delivery of a vital public 
service.  By necessity, health care governance is a highly dynamic regime 
with rapid changes driven by an aging population, an aging health care 
workforce, increasingly complex and expensive technology in diagnostic 
and treatment tools, increased costs of pharmaceuticals, and changing 
morbidity and mortality patterns. 
Disclosure is a key feature of corporate governance.  Transparency of 
business plans and operational results allow corporations to attract and 
retain capital and allow investors to monitor the use of their equity or debt 
capital.  Applied to the health care sector, the types of corporate objectives 
that might be disclosed include policies relating to medical and service 
delivery ethics, funding priorities in terms of capital projects or service 
delivery, and environmental and other public policy commitments.  Such 
disclosure allows the health care institution to be evaluated in relation to its 
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delivery mandate and community needs.  The disclosure problem squarely 
raises the issue of the extent to which health care officers and managers 
should be accountable to investors, including consumers of the health care 
services and citizens through the collective engagement of their tax dollars.   
In order for disclosure to be an effective tool of governance, it must have 
a means by which it can create incentives to change.  In the for-profit sector, 
incentives are generated by the ability of shareholders to exit by selling 
their shares in the market when the disclosure reveals problems, or to use 
the threat of exit to influence corporate behavior.  However, in the not-for-
profit publicly-funded sector, the connection between disclosure and 
incentive to improve is less clear.  What mechanism can be used to hold 
decision makers accountable for their governance decisions if the group to 
whom they are accountable has no effective means of voicing its views on 
the oversight decisions?  While regional health councils do perform aspects 
of this role in Canada, as do governments as proxies of taxpayers, those 
most directly invested in, and in receipt of, health care services do not have 
access to accountability structures.  In determining how to create a voice for 
health consumers/investors in the governance decisions of hospital and 
other public boards, it might be helpful to refer to recent legislative 
initiatives that have provided minority shareholders in corporations with a 
greater voice. 
The challenge for accountability is even greater with the growing 
diversity of capital structures in health care and the increased amount of 
private health care delivery.  Generally, in the corporate arena there has 
been rigorous debate on the necessity and scope of regulatory intervention 
in governance.  I have suggested that this has shaped the debate regarding 
protection of equity capital as a fundamental principle to the exclusion of 
consideration of other kinds of investments, with distributional 
consequences for social and economic wealth.42  With the shifts to private 
delivery of services, many of these challenges are now entering health care 
governance.  The Canadian health care system has traditionally been 
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accountable to public consumers through the periodic mechanism of 
elections where, as taxpayers, consumers voice their approval or 
disapproval of governance choices.  However, this is too blunt a tool 
because it only measures overall satisfaction with health care governance.  
It does not allow for accountability checks for directors and officers of 
particular health care institutions or agencies.  Shifts from public to private 
governance shift not only the normative objectives (for-profit versus not-
for-profit), but also the mechanisms to influence policy on delivery of 
health services. 
Similarly, a challenge for governance of both private health care 
enterprises and public health care institutions is to ensure that the health 
care system has the capacity to meet anticipated demands for health 
services.  This includes, human resource planning to ensure the supply, 
retention, and effective deployment of health care professionals and support 
workers.  Health care activity substantially contributes to the Canadian 
economy in production/service output and employment in direct and spin-
off businesses.  For example, in 1997, the health research economic base in 
the life science industry was $36 billion, and in 2003 the life science 
industry employed 130,000 researchers.43  Hence, governance must take 
into account health care services as an economic investment tool, with the 
attendant need to effectively direct economic, service, and research 
activities. 
Whether the delivery of health care is public or private, it is necessary to 
develop a governance framework that clearly defines policy objectives and 
responds to primary health care needs.  These objectives include prevention, 
early detection, patient-centered treatment, effective quality health care 
delivery (including geographically accessible health care to meet current 
shortages in rural, northern, and First Nations communities), a more 
comprehensive definition of accessible heath care that addresses the needs 
of those with mental illness and those who require palliative care and post-
acute home care, and a legislative framework that includes public coverage 
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for medically necessary diagnostic services including the finances to 
support this delivery in a timely and effective way.44   
To prevent shirking or self-dealing by decision makers, the framework 
requires enhanced disclosure to consumers, including information about 
their own health status and the potential health outcomes of any particular 
treatment.  Strategic human resource planning for the supply and 
distribution of health care workers is also a necessary component of 
governance if providers are to respond to rapidly changing health care 
needs.  Training and education will allow health care providers to work in 
integrated team settings, responding to the changing skill sets required in 
the health care sector while still recognizing prior contributions of these 
professionals.  Finally, the governance framework must foster transparency 
and accountability in decisions regarding ethical standards, health care 
delivery, and funding. 
In meeting these objectives, there may be different policy priorities 
across the public and private sectors.  Ideally, in publicly delivered health 
care, those with stewardship of public resources should be accountable to 
the public.  Costs should be measured against the public’s perception of 
whether the goals of accessibility and universality are achieved.  However, 
in the private sector, even when the goal is timely and effective service, 
there is considerable pressure to maximize profits.  While these issues are 
frequently at odds with one another, they intersect at the need for effective 
governance. 
V.  THE HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE—OVERSIGHT CHALLENGES 
AND INSTRUMENTS OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE 
In the current health care marketplace, sustainability is a key challenge, 
both for the long-term viability of a particular organization and for the 
overall long-term protection of timely and accessible health care services.  
Sustainability can be accomplished by effective oversight and stewardship, 
by ensuring that decision makers act independently to assess strategic and 
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operational choices, by establishing mechanisms to respond to crises that 
are unique to health care, and by promoting ethical practices by all market 
participants.  These are discussed in turn. 
A.  Sustainability and Oversight 
Health care enterprises and governments at all levels are struggling with 
how to improve the quality of health care delivery and management of 
services under the pressure of burgeoning costs.  In order for Canadian 
health care delivery to be sustainable, there may be a need to re-
conceptualize health care financing and management.  National health 
standards need to be reinforced with enhanced measurement and disclosure 
of performance.  Performance is normatively defined by enhanced health 
outcomes or by increased control of costs.  How one measures performance 
leads to particular choices in governance.  A series of government policy 
documents being produced in Canada examine sustainability goals and 
ways to measure achievement of the goals.  One Alberta study has proposed 
three screens for measuring the optimal mix of publicly-funded health care 
services:  a technical screen that assesses whether treatments are safe and 
demonstrate positive health outcomes; a social and economic screen that 
assesses ethical issues and access to health care services; and a fiscal screen 
that assesses the cost implications of funding particular combinations of 
services.45  
The policy objectives enshrined in these recent studies, which promote a 
shift in governance goals, are laudable, but they are accompanied by 
particular challenges for health care sustainability.  For example, the 
objective of providing the best care possible in an appropriate setting calls 
for the optimal mix of hospital, acute care facilities, and home and 
community care services.  An integrated health care delivery system is a 
sensible governance objective.  In their oversight obligations, directors may 
determine that reducing the length of hospital stays is efficient in terms of 
resources expended within the institution.  To prevent unnecessary 
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hospitalization, however, health care consumers must have access to better 
support in the community such as physicians, nurses, service providers, and 
home care services so that they receive the required continuum of care and 
support.  But once patients are released into the community, hospital and 
acute care facilities have limited control over delivery choices.  The risk 
posed is that access to acute care services is reduced and patients are 
returned to the community too rapidly for the available support services.  As 
a result, community health care services are stretched inappropriately, and 
family members bear an increasingly heavier share of post-acute, 
rehabilitative, and palliative care, resulting in economic and social costs to 
the family.46  In sum, these issues are complex and difficult to resolve.   
Policy objectives aimed at providing alternatives to institutional care 
must ensure that health care resources are seriously directed to alternatives 
and must ensure that effective governance mechanisms are in place for 
adequate oversight and delivery of community-based alternatives.  Hence, a 
challenge for governance is to ensure that hospitals and similar institutions 
do not minimize their costs by creating what are referred to as 
“externalities” in corporate governance theory.  Externalities are created 
when the organization sheds costs outside of the organization to give the 
appearance of generating efficiencies while merely transferring those costs 
to other parts of the system without clear evidence of the public policy 
benefits of such actions.  These governance decisions have distributive 
consequences for health consumers in terms of both the availability of 
services and the financial burden that it may create. 
Similarly, the governance objective of managing within budget allocation 
assumes that adequate funds will be allocated for health care spending.  
There are difficult ethical and moral questions about who should have 
priority in accessing acute care services, and there are serious risks posed by 
making allocation decisions based on age, health, and economic status.  
Should those with financial oversight of the health care enterprise be 
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determining these priorities?  Should the decision making also involve 
health care practitioners, consumers, and health care advocates?   
Governance should ensure that the health care delivery organizations are 
accountable to the communities in which they operate.  This accountability 
should be grounded in public policies of investor (taxpayer and consumer) 
protection, environmental protection, and employment standards.47  
Professor Lynne Dallas has suggested that a corporate board representing 
diverse interests is a means of enhancing governance, including assisting in 
acquiring resources, reducing environmental uncertainty, making optimal 
use of the skills of diverse participants, and ensuring that decision making 
takes account of the context in which the corporation operates.48  Extending 
this to the health care sector, boards of health care institutions could engage 
in more effective oversight by ensuring that diverse interests are represented 
at the governance level through diligent recruitment, selection, and the 
training of directors.  The board could insist on similar processes 
throughout the organization that make assessments of where resources will 
be allocated.  Further, it is worth remembering that public health care 
institutions face capital constraints unlike those in the private sector because 
they cannot seek additional capital in the market.  Constraint may make the 
most effective oversight unable to generate more positive health income. 
Effective strategic planning has its greatest positive measure in improved 
health outcomes, as opposed to profits that are generated.  For example, the 
objectives of prevention of disease, illness, and injury are vitally important 
goals of the health care system.  Health promotion, disease prevention, and 
injury prevention programs encourage healthier living, address risks to 
health, and prevent future health problems.49  Yet, even the link between 
prevention and a positive health outcome requires careful oversight of 
decision making.  Many preventive programs are currently aimed at 
lifestyle choices regarding the consumption of goods and the increase of 
physical exercise.  While these are vitally important factors in morbidity 
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and mortality, there are larger health related issues that cause serious health 
harms.   
For example, environmental conditions, lack of enforcement of 
workplace health and safety standards, and economic conditions that lead to 
widespread poverty and inequitable access to positive health outcomes are 
all health related issues that cause serious health harms.  However, health 
care institutions and their governance practices are only one piece of the 
sustainability puzzle, and even the most effective oversight of these 
institutions alone will not result in sustainability.  Just as for-profit 
corporations are faced with the challenge of competition in the global 
capital marketplace, those with oversight obligations of publicly delivered 
services need to engage in sustainability planning on both a micro and 
macro level.   
Issues of employment, environmental, and occupational health and safety 
conditions present significant challenges that pose serious barriers to 
increased prevention and health promotion.  For instance, the failure to take 
expeditious regulatory action regarding asbestos, smoking, and toxic 
substances used in workplace processes has direct implications for health 
care management and costs to the system.  Currently, the corporate 
enterprises that generate these problems do not pay for the health care costs 
associated with the inevitable, negative health outcomes caused by their 
wealth-generating activity.50  As a result, there are inadequate incentives to 
reduce harm, and the cost of the harm is shifted to the already overburdened 
health care sector.  As long as the costs of these harms are externalized from 
the corporations to the tax base and health consumers, there will be few ex 
ante incentives to reduce environmental and occupational harms.  One 
further issue is whether it is the responsibility of those with oversight of 
health care enterprises to raise these issues, as key advocates in health care 
delivery systems and governmental relations. 
For publicly-funded, nonprofit health organizations, the issue is whether 
the current accountability mechanisms are able to generate the appropriate 
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proactive response to issues of sustainability.  Without the need to generate 
profits and the budget setting power of the private sector for-profit 
organizations, how can the nonprofit institution receive the signals that 
highlight the need to look at sustainability?  On the other hand, 
sustainability is always counterpoised to the continuous pressure to generate 
profit in the for-profit sector.  Thus, in the for-profit sector, the issue will be 
how and by what mechanism an appropriate balance can be struck between 
profit and the sustainability of the health care system.  
B. Stewardship and Accountability 
Stewardship and accountability are two critical components of effective 
governance.  Stewardship refers to the duties of directors and officers to be 
diligent and responsible in their decision making and oversight, and by 
which they have regard for the objectives of the health care institution for 
which they are responsible.  In corporate law, one thinks of stewardship as 
the oversight of the operation to ensure that corporate officers maximize 
enterprise value.  Accountability refers to the obligation of directors and 
officers to be answerable for their decisions and the mechanisms that exist 
to make this accountability meaningful by creating incentives for change 
when effective oversight or management is lacking. 
Governance of health care institutions is arguably more nuanced and 
more challenging.  Both corporations and health care institutions should 
seek to enhance their ability to raise capital, achieve environmental and 
production sustainability, and to effectively comply with legal standards.  
However, the health care sector has the added challenge of providing timely 
and accessible services.  In both Canada and the United States, health care 
enterprises operate in a highly regulated environment.  Compliance with 
legal and professional standards is a key governance objective because 
failure to comply may adversely affect licensing or funding to continue 
operations.  Interestingly, public governance of health care delivery is 
administratively more efficient than in the private for-profit sector.  As a 
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result of Medicare’s single payer system, the Romanow Report revealed 
that Canadians pay two-thirds less than Americans for health care 
administration on a per capita basis.51 
Effective stewardship responsibilities include setting the strategic 
direction of the health care enterprise and monitoring the progress of the 
ongoing implementation of the strategic plan; evaluating both the upside 
and downside risks of particular strategies and creating formal systems for 
identifying and assessing risk; and approving and monitoring major capital 
expenditures, capitalization decisions, acquisitions, divestment and funding.  
Stewardship involves the recruiting, appointing, setting the compensation 
for and monitoring performance of senior managers.  It entails monitoring 
the operational and financial performance of the health care enterprise and 
regularly assessing that performance against the strategic plan.  It must also 
involve the monitoring of compliance with statutory and regulatory 
requirements, which include ensuring that mechanisms are in place to 
identify, report, warn, and then remedy any failure or risk of failure to meet 
standards.  Effective oversight also requires having an audit committee in 
place that reviews the enterprise’s financial statements, reviews reports of 
external and internal audits, and has an effective process for responding to 
and correcting problems or challenges raised by the audits.  
In Canada, many of these stewardship measures are being implemented 
by health care institutions as benchmarks of effective governance.  Yet, not 
all governance decisions can be effectively managed by the individual 
institution.  For example, accessibility has been a hallmark of the health 
care system; yet, there are problems becoming apparent in the system, 
indicating a need for enhanced stewardship in service delivery decisions.  
The University Health Network reported that in 2001, hospitals in Toronto, 
the second largest city in Canada, were on critical care by-pass (not 
accepting ambulances) for 30 percent of the time in the month of May.52  
Furthermore, the wait time for elective MRI tests was six to eight weeks; 
and 30 percent of cancer patients were waiting longer than the 
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recommended maximum eight weeks for radiation therapy.53  There have 
also been periods of net migration of physicians and nurses out of Canada, 
which necessitated the importation of professionals from developing 
countries; as a result, the pool of physician and nursing services in those 
nations is depleted.54  Many of these issues involve stewardship beyond the 
individual health care enterprise, which implicate the government’s 
stewardship responsibilities.  
Directors owe a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the 
corporation or the health care enterprise.  This necessitates careful and 
prudent management of resources, having regard to those with interests in 
the health care enterprise.  In the Canadian system, there are different 
stewardship incentives depending on where the decision maker is located.  
Hospital managers are required to procure and deliver services as efficiently 
as possible.  Such efficiency is measured by the costs of providing 
particular services in the hospital.  Directors, officers, and managers are 
responsible for ensuring compliance with legal and professional standards; 
managing technologies, including appropriate adoption, financing and 
monitoring of health outcomes; developing strategic plans for targeted 
acquisitions of specialized technology based on population needs and 
possible collaborative use of these technologies with other facilities; and 
developing programs that assess clinical benefits and cost-effectiveness of 
technologies.  In contrast, physicians have professional standards that relate 
to both competence in their field and standards of ethical practice.  Many of 
the clinical decisions are made by the physicians; thus, direction on the 
amount of nursing or physiotherapy care, the levels of medication, 
diagnosis, and treatment are driven by a care ethic in which physicians work 
in tandem with, but independently of, decisions of hospital administrators. 
Health care is now a $100 billion enterprise in Canada.  While the 
overwhelming majority of these expenditures are under the control of 
governments or their agencies, issues of accountability and oversight are 
key challenges.55  Accountability in the health care sector requires more 
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than accountability to shareholders.  It requires careful decision making on 
where to expend resources in a world of increasingly complex health 
problems and greater demands for new technological intervention.  It also 
requires difficult decisions about where to allocate dollars in the health care 
system so that it meets the needs of society and is still an economically 
viable enterprise.   
The Romanow Report characterized Canadians as the shareholders of the 
public health care system because they own it and are the sole reason that 
the health care system exists.56  Canadians feel a sense of entitlement to 
universally accessible health care.  This issue was apparent in the 2004 
federal election where Canadians identified universal access to publicly-
funded health care as one of the most important issues facing Canada.57  In 
response, the Canadian prime minister in September 2004, announced $41 
billion of new federal funding over the next ten years to support the 
government’s action plan on health.58  The funding will be aimed at 
fulfilling the recommendations of the Romanow Report and will allocate 
resources to reduce acute care wait times to northern and Aboriginal 
communities and to home care services and catastrophic drug coverage.59  
This priority expressed at the polls resulted in new funding and planning 
commitments by the federal government.  However, accountability also 
requires mechanisms that allow Canadians to express health care 
preferences between elections.  This would enhance the regulatory and 
institutional accountability that is already well developed in the Canadian 
health care system.  
Another aspect of accountability is the issue of negligence and medical 
malpractice.  In Canada, long-established standards of care are being 
challenged by the impact of funding cutbacks, service reallocation, and the 
implications for doctors and others making decisions on medical and health 
care.  Limited resources, particularly in emergency rooms, may give rise to 
new concerns regarding reasonable care standards and the risk of liability.60  
Physicians owe duties to both the hospital in which they are working and to 
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the health care consumers they are treating.  Physicians are at risk of 
making health care decisions based more on resource restrictions than best 
treatment practices, which in turn may give rise to new liability concerns 
and may have negative effects on health care services.  Unlike the United 
States, where medical malpractice has long been a feature of the health care 
system, in Canada malpractice has not generally been an issue.  Hence, the 
incentive effects of funding constraints on health care directors, officers, 
and direct service providers require further consideration. 
Accountability also engages the debate regarding how health care 
providers can be accountable to shareholders for their decisions.  Creating 
diverse representation on health care boards provides one measure of 
expanding accountability.  However, given the fundamental nature of health 
care delivery, a question for future research is whether there is a framework 
that allows health care enterprises to effectively manage their resources 
while providing a role for public policy, regulatory standards, and the 
participation of health care consumers in governance decisions that affect 
health care delivery in the community. 
C.  Independence of Directors 
Perhaps the greatest lesson of the recent corporate scandals in the United 
States is the need for independent oversight by a board of directors.  Health 
care governance also needs effective independent oversight.  The board’s 
role is to monitor the effectiveness of the overall operations of the health 
care enterprise in order to ensure the long term value and sustainability 
discussed above.  Director independence requires the ability to 
dispassionately assess whether or not officers are implementing the 
enterprise’s strategic plan, are effectively operating the business, and are not 
engaged in self-dealing or shirking.  As demonstrated by the Enron scandal, 
it is apparent that even when the majority of directors meet statutory 
definitions of independence, there is still the need for independent oversight 
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to reduce opportunities for self-dealing, self-enrichment, and corporate 
culture that fail to engage in effective oversight. 
The successful achievement of independent oversight varies in Canadian 
health care institutions.  In publicly run Canadian hospitals, board members 
are drawn from both the health care profession and the public; boards 
frequently seek to attract independent people with diverse skills to act in an 
oversight capacity.  For private hospitals and health care institutions, there 
is a particular challenge to ensuring independence, especially when board 
members are selected by corporate officers or are nominated by major 
shareholders.   
In the United States, publicly traded health care corporations must now 
comply with new regulatory standards under the NYSE or securities 
legislation and must ensure that the majority of directors are independent.61  
In Canada, while this is considered to be best practice by the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, to date, corporate law does not require that the majority of 
directors be independent.  However, these policies are shifting for 
companies that are public issuers as new national securities instruments are 
imposing independence requirements similar to those in place in the United 
States.  In both jurisdictions there are obligations to ensure that directors 
disclose economic and other relations with health care corporations, and 
there are statutory provisions designed to prevent self-dealing by directors.  
Independence requirements are also starting to drive recruitment, selection, 
and retention of directors and officers in not-for-profit health care 
institutions as auditor generals increasingly monitor governance activities in 
their assessment of fund transfers to these agencies.  
Independence must be accompanied by other factors necessary for 
effective oversight.  Directors of health care institutions should contribute 
knowledge, experience, skills, expertise, and diversity that will allow the 
board of directors as a whole to oversee and to direct the business and 
affairs of the enterprise.  These diverse skill requirements apply whether the 
enterprise is publicly or privately held.  However, independent oversight 
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does not equate with inaction, and directors have a positive obligation to 
monitor and take action to ensure the health care enterprise is meeting 
statutory and regulatory standards.   
The duty to monitor requires the following: access to financial and 
operating information; access to managers to answer questions and to 
provide information; time provided to effectively scrutinize proposed 
changes to capitalization, operations, or strategic direction; the ability to 
access independent advisors when necessary; succession planning for key 
directors and officers; and separate sessions of non-management directors 
on a regularly scheduled basis so that directors can reflect independently on 
the overall management of the health care enterprise.  These are elements of 
good governance that should be considered in ensuring that directors are 
independent, diligent, and acting in the best interests of the health care 
enterprise. 
In addition to annual independence checks, health care boards of 
directors are increasingly undertaking performance reviews, in terms of 
evaluating their effectiveness in the oversight process, of both the board of 
directors as a whole and of individual directors.62  Performance reviews 
consist of self-evaluation, evaluation by other directors, and evaluation by 
those immediately working with the directors (a “360 evaluation”).  Such 
evaluation can identify areas in which directors may require enhanced 
training, such as in audit functions, and it can also identify weaknesses in 
the range of skills covered by the board, which in turn provides valuable 
information for recruiting new directors to the board. 
Finally, in monitoring the operational and financial performance of the 
health care enterprise, there is an obligation for directors to independently 
assess whether or not the enterprise is operating ethically, responsibly, and 
in compliance with legal, regulatory, and professional standards.  As will be 
discussed below, ethical decision making is particularly significant in the 
health care sector. 
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D.  Transparency, Disclosure, and Privacy Challenges for Governance  
Generally, corporate governance disclosure is viewed as essential to 
capital markets.  Investors need to be able to access information that will 
allow them to determine whether to invest their capital in a particular 
enterprise or whether to exit.  Optimal disclosure involves not only profit 
and loss disclosure, but also disclosure in terms of the activities of the 
corporation, sustainability measures, as well as mechanisms in place for the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest and managerial shirking.  Recent Canadian 
securities regulation also includes requirements for issuers to report 
environmental, social, and health risks to the enterprise as part of 
transparency initiatives.63  In the health care marketplace, calls for enhanced 
disclosure are aimed at increasing the accountability of decision makers and 
at providing a reliable base of information from which to make difficult 
decisions about the allocation of increasingly scarce health care capital.  
Essential information management and technology systems are required, 
including  the ability to manage, monitor, and make transparent the costs 
and benefits of new technology and treatment strategies, as well as to 
monitor threats to public health.  The recent Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) crisis highlighted the need for transparency and 
disclosure between institutions, health care authorities, and nations in order 
to alert health care deliverers and the public to potential risks.  A measure of 
good governance is effective information management with transparency in 
both health risks and in the decision making processes.   
There are also critical issues associated with patient rights to disclosure 
about their own health information.  Recent health information legislation 
authorizes individuals to access their own health information and 
establishes rules regulating the registration, collection, disclosure, and 
protection of health information by custodians.64  The Centre for Global e-
Health Innovation has observed that consumers want to participate in health 
related decisions, want full access to information, want the right to disclose 
that information to another provider and seek a second opinion, and want to 
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communicate with their health care providers.65  The Canada Health 
Infoway is a government supported nonprofit corporation with 
responsibility for accelerating the development and adoption of modern 
systems of information technology, with the aim of providing enhanced 
health care.66   
The Romanow Report emphasized that a critical component of enhanced 
disclosure is the need to expand health literacy by creating access to 
relevant, credible, and user-friendly health care information.  Another 
crucial component of enhanced disclosure is facilitating development of 
skills for health care consumers to process and understand the 
information.67  In light of these developments, the role of the board is to 
ensure that managers are responding to these challenges and initiatives in a 
manner that complies with regulatory requirements and respects privacy 
concerns. 
The other side of the disclosure issue is the privacy interest.  With the 
introduction of personal electronic health records and electronic medical 
summaries providing key patient information to authorized primary health 
care providers, there is a need to ensure limited access, protection of 
privacy, and sanctions for violation of that privacy.  In Canada, privacy 
legislation in the health care sector has been aimed at both facilitating the 
sharing of health information among professionals in order to enhance 
diagnosis and treatment, and the challenge of ensuring that an individual’s 
health information remains private.68  Increased technology has meant 
increasing challenges for health information custody and oversight of that 
activity.  Privacy considerations enter into decisions regarding resource 
allocation to establish and maintain information-sharing systems with the 
appropriate privacy safeguards.  Hence, oversight of budget and financial 
decisions requires strategic planning and resource allocation to meet the 
privacy challenges and appropriate controls on information flow. 
These privacy issues also engage the public/private debate with respect to 
how information services are effectively delivered while protecting privacy 
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interests.  In April 2004, the British Columbia Government and Service 
Employees’ Union petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia to 
declare that the contracting out of information services to a private company 
in the United States was in violation of the CHA and the Medicare 
Protection Act, constituting a violation of the Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act.69  The British Columbia Ministry of Health 
Services sought a private partner to take over the operation of the B.C. 
Medical Services Plan, including medical records management and 
processing.70  The proposed private partner is a U.S. firm subject to the U.S. 
Patriot Act (“Patriot Act”).71  The accompanying affidavit by a lawyer with 
the American Civil Liberties Union suggests that there is a serious threat to 
the privacy of medical records under section 215 of the Patriot Act, given 
the extraordinary powers granted to the FBI to secure and retain such 
records without any mechanism through which a person served with an 
order to disclose can challenge the order before complying with it.72  The 
petitioner alleges that the Patriot Act could be used to secure the records of 
Canadians if a Section 215 Order is served upon the company, even if the 
records are held in Canada.73  The petitioner urges the B.C. privacy 
commissioner to examine the implications of information services being 
outsourced to a United States linked service provider and to determine 
whether it is a violation of the CHA.74  This B.C. initiative has also sparked 
a Right to Privacy Campaign by consumer health and rights groups because 
of their concern that medical and health records obtained under the Patriot 
Act would be used for inappropriate purposes in violation of Canadian 
Charter rights.75 
While technology has enhanced access to information for consumers and 
for the profession such that better and timelier care decisions can be made, 
it has also created new concerns for ensuring that sensitive health 
information is secure.  Effective governance requires that these systems are 
monitored, periodically evaluated, and adjusted in order to meet privacy 
concerns. 
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E.  Infectious Disease Crisis Management 
Health care oversight is further complicated by shifts in patterns of 
disease.  A key governance challenge is how to provide effective 
mechanisms to deal with the outbreak of quasi-epidemics of new infectious 
diseases.  An example is the recent crisis generated by the outbreak in 
Canada of SARS.  Any belief that North America had infectious diseases 
under control was shaken in 2003 when the City of Toronto faced a public 
health crisis in SARS cases, including forty-four deaths of patients and 
health care providers and a billion dollars in economic damage to the 
community.76  The SARS outbreak highlighted the need for the health care 
system to immediately respond to protect consumers, professionals, and the 
public.  Health care institutions were among the key actors that had to make 
decisions regarding the treatment of those affected by SARS, the need to 
protect health care workers, the closure of hospital services to new patients, 
the quarantine of thousands of individuals, and the prohibitions on patient 
visitors and non-essential workers.  
Numerous governance questions arise out of the SARS crisis that have 
not yet been resolved, either domestically or internationally, in jurisdictions 
that have recognized this vulnerable aspect of their oversight obligations.  
The questions include the following:  how can health care facilities best 
manage a crisis with available resources, and are there systems in place for 
identifying and immediately responding to suspected infectious disease 
outbreaks?  What is the standard of care expected from health care 
institutions, and how can hospitals put in place mechanisms that respond to 
service needs while providing liability protection for emergency response 
professionals?  What are the rights of employees exposed to infectious 
diseases who refuse to work, and how may they be compensated if they are 
unable to perform their work safely?77  What is the liability risk for health 
care institutions and governments if they fail to adequately warn the public 
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and ensure adequate testing?  Is there a need to rethink insurance and 
contract clauses to address the question of force majeure clauses for risk 
allocation?78   
Other important questions are how one addresses the issue of voluntary 
or mandatory quarantine for those exposed to highly infectious diseases, 
and how one enforces a mandatory system.  While most people complied 
with the quarantines during the SARS crisis, some did not.  Both provincial 
and federal governments have amended health protection legislation to 
increase quarantine powers in such circumstances, cognizant of the possible 
challenge posed by balancing public health protection and risk of Charter 
violations of an individual’s liberty rights.79  At the same time, the crisis 
engaged privacy concerns because the government refused to name those 
with SARS.80  This raises the question of whether the existing rules of 
confidentiality should change during an infectious disease crisis, and if so, 
how the privacy of individuals can be protected while simultaneously 
monitoring threats to the public’s health.  These are both health and 
governance questions that must be explored in the near future.  
F.  Ethical Decision Making in the Health Market Context 
Governance of health care requires ethical decision making in all aspects 
of the oversight obligation—from decisions on capital projects to service 
delivery.  The need for ethical behavior in the health care context is 
essential because decision makers are often dealing with vulnerable 
stakeholders.  Health care directors and officers have an obligation not to 
exploit that vulnerability and to fulfill their fiduciary obligations by acting 
with due care and diligence.  Ethical decision making is best approached by 
creating an ethical climate that permeates the board of directors and all 
levels of the organization.   
In her paper entitled Enron and Ethical Corporate Climates, Lynne 
Dallas examines the institutional structures that give rise to particular 
corporate ethical climates.81  She suggests that organizational policies, 
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practices, and procedures influence moral awareness, moral behavior, and 
the criteria used in moral decision making, and that these factors were 
influential in creating the climate for unethical behavior that led to recent 
corporate scandals in the United States.82  Examining literature on moral 
and ethical behavior across several disciplines, Professor Dallas concludes 
that individuals ordinarily determine the appropriate course of action by 
reference to social norms in their working context; whether employees 
apply a different set of ethics at work and at home; whether empathy-based 
morals are encouraged or discouraged; and individual choice of referent (the 
person after whom their behavior is modeled).83 
These observations have resonance for the health care sector.  If the 
climate is one in which the profit motive is the primary driver, then the 
climate may discourage empathy-based care giving and decision making.  If 
those with oversight of the health care enterprise set the tone or moral 
direction and are the referent for employees, then decisions about whether 
health care delivery should be focused primarily on the health care 
consumer or primarily on cost-containment will profoundly influence how 
decisions are made and carried out on the hospital, nursing home, or clinic. 
These questions engage issues beyond compliance with legal standards of 
care and professionalism.  Such standards, which are legislatively set in 
health laws and regulatory instruments and by self-regulating professions, 
carry sanctions for non-compliance.  For the most part, in Canada, they are 
effective in maintaining high standards of care and professionalism.  The 
availability of sanctions for unethical behavior acts as a normative temper 
on self-dealing or shirking.  However, ethics engage a range of other 
decisions that may affect consumers’ experience with the health care 
system.  Ethics decisions may affect consumers’ ability to make informed 
choices about health decisions and treatments, may relate to the quality of 
care they receive, and affect the value assigned to providing a positive 
experience by health care providers at all levels of a health care 
organization. 
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Compliance with legal standards and requirements should ideally only be 
the base requirement with health care delivery organizations offering a level 
of care, service, and accountability that exceeds statutory minimum 
requirements.  The board’s role is to ensure that their managers’ decision 
making is meeting these objectives.  It is here that ethics plays a role.  In 
health care, there are thousands of decisions made daily on the basis of 
treatment needs, consideration for the physical, mental and emotional health 
of the consumer, and limitations in resources and personnel.  If one 
considers health care a public good, as it is in Canada, then the decision 
makers must pay attention not only to profit margin and cost control, but 
also to the delivery of effective, accessible, transparent, fair, and ethical 
health care.  The institutional ethical climate set by those with oversight and 
governance responsibilities will determine much of the conduct in the 
frontline delivery of services. 
Health care enterprises that are adopting codes of ethical conduct are 
attempting to ensure a level of practice and procedures aimed at ethical 
standards and delivery of service.  Underpinning such codes is the 
expectation that directors, managers, and staff will have objectives of 
integrity, honesty, and fairness in their dealings with health care consumers.  
A key factor in the effectiveness of such codes is that employees receive 
adequate information and training on the expectations under such codes.  
Hence, health care directors should have monitoring systems in place to 
ensure that the actual practices meet these standards.  There should be 
mechanisms that allow for both health care consumers and employees to 
report violations of ethical codes of conduct, without fear of reprisal either 
in the quality of their health care or in their employment status.  The codes 
must be enforced in order to set standards of delivery that truly meet the 
health care delivery objectives of the organization.  There must also be 
mechanisms to periodically review the standards and codes of conduct 
based on society’s understanding of what constitutes effective governance.  
In addition, the health care enterprise may have learned lessons from a 
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particular experience or case of health care shirking that requires the ability 
to adjust the institution’s standards of care and conduct. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While the purpose of corporate activity generally is to maximize the 
value of the enterprise, the goal of health care governance in Canada is to 
maximize the value of its health care services.  In this, Canada does not face 
quite the same governance challenges as the health care market in the 
United States, where the simultaneous, and sometimes conflicting, goals of 
profit and service delivery are particularly challenging.  However, the need 
for effective corporate governance, with its goals of enhanced disclosure, 
oversight, and accountability, is as great in Canada’s publicly-funded, not-
for-profit system as it is in a for-profit corporate enterprise. 
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